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‘The mental rimmed the sensuous’: Nabokov and the Singularity of Literary 
Experience  
 
 
Abstract 
Vladimir Nabokov’s writing is widely recognised for its intensely philosophical and 
poetical character, yet how these two qualities relate to one another remains a vexed 
question. The most compelling critical responses to this issue are those of Brian Boyd 
and Martin Hägglund, who have offered conflicting interpretations of Ada or Ardor, 
arguably Nabokov’s most challenging and moving work of fiction. This essay begins by 
examining a recent published debate between Boyd and Hägglund - paying particular 
attention to their differing methods of close reading - to develop a more nuanced 
account of how literary fictions engage with human experience, and of how we as literary 
critics can most adequately respond to them. I argue for the need to capture the 
specifically literary qualities of a novel, and particularly the vital interconnections between 
textual descriptions of characters’ experiences and the experiences - both cognitive and 
affective - those descriptions solicit from readers. The reading of Ada or Ardor illustrates 
how this approach makes possible a richer and more accurate response to the singular 
qualities of Nabokov’s fiction.  
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 Vladimir Nabokov’s Ada or Ardor: A Family Chronicle (1969) was recently the 
subject of a fierce disagreement between Brian Boyd, inarguably the foremost Nabokov 
scholar, and Martin Hägglund, now widely recognised as a major philosopher and literary 
theorist. Their frank exchange in the pages of New Literary History was prompted by 
Hägglund’s account of the novel’s engagement with temporal finitude, in an article later 
published without significant revision in his celebrated Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, 
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Nabokov. Hägglund provocatively contradicts Boyd’s well-established thesis that Nabokov 
and his protagonists aspire towards a timeless consciousness invulnerable to loss, arguing 
that such a position is logically incoherent, and that Ada in fact stages a desire for 
survival, to go on living mortally in time. I want to begin this article by evaluating the 
ensuing debate, which represents two of the most powerful responses to Nabokov’s 
writing. The principal interest of Boyd and Hägglund’s dispute is not, however, the issue 
of temporal finitude, or even their readings of the novel, but rather the meeting of 
conflicting approaches to the text behind which lie two fundamentally disparate 
philosophies of literary fiction. Following this debate can guide us towards a new 
understanding of a major literary theoretical concern: how do fictions engage with human 
experience, and how can we, as critics, adequately respond to them? My own reading of 
Ada in the latter part of this article seeks to advance a more accurate and persuasive 
account of the novel, but also to illustrate the value of a particular mode of close reading, 
which draws on the most fruitful aspect of each critic’s approach.  
 
 Hägglund’s essay begins with a summary of his increasingly well-known theory of 
‘chronolibido’, later articulated more fully in the introduction to Dying for Time:  
 
What I want to emphasize […] is not only that the temporal finitude of 
survival is an inescapable condition but also that the investment in survival 
animates and inspires all the forms of care […] It is because one is attached 
to a temporal being (chronophilia) that one fears losing it (chronophobia). 
Care in general, I argue, depends on such a double bind. On the one hand, 
care is necessarily chronophilic, since only something that is subject to the 
possibility of loss - and hence temporal - can give one a reason to care. On 
the other hand, care is necessarily chronophobic, since one cannot care 
about something without fearing what may happen to it. […]  
The chronolibidinal logic at work here does not deny that we dream of 
paradises and afterlives. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that these dreams 
themselves are inhabited and sustained by temporal finitude.1  
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It on these grounds that Hägglund challenges Boyd as ‘the most influential proponent’ of 
the view that Nabokov’s ‘writing is driven by a desire to transcend the condition of time’ 
(DFT, 84), arguing that such transcendence would entail the negation of chronophobia 
and chronophilia. In response, Boyd agrees that the text manifests the chronolibidinal 
double bind Hägglund describes, but contends that Nabokov also strives to imagine non- 
or extra-human modes of consciousness which escape this limit. To support his position, 
Boyd cites his widely known argument that Ada’s ‘internal allusions combine to suggest 
[…] a behind-the-scenes timelessness’, a claim we will return to shortly.2 With Hägglund’s 
counter-response, the discussion reaches an unprofitable impasse, with each critic 
restating his original thesis without apprehending the challenge posed by the other.  
 There are two interrelated reasons for this impasse: Hägglund’s lack of clarity 
about what he means by the ‘logic’ of chronolibido, and Boyd’s assumption that 
Nabokov’s own beliefs are relevant to his interlocutor’s position. ‘Logic’ unhelpfully 
implies that chronolibido is concerned with human conceptions of temporal desire (and 
Boyd reasonably interprets it as such), whereas Hägglund’s argument is actually that all 
manifestations of desire, experienced by any kind of consciousness, would be subject to 
its strictures. To the extent that Boyd suggests that certain modes of consciousness are 
beyond human conception, Hägglund fails to address the substance of Boyd’s rebuttal, and 
both leave untouched the underlying and potentially fascinating point of contention 
about the capacity of conceptual thought to contemplate the possible and the impossible. 
On a related point of methodology, only in his counter-reply and in Dying for Time does 
Hägglund clarify that he is ‘not charging Boyd with having misconstrued Nabokov’s 
philosophy’,3 but rather seeking ‘to elucidate how the logic of chronolibido is operative in 
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his writing’ (DFT, p. 85). Compared to Boyd’s unapologetic deference towards 
Nabokov’s stated philosophical opinions, Hägglund’s apparently more direct engagement 
with the text looks attractive. Yet Hägglund’s approach is more radical than a 
straightforward emphasis upon text above authorial intention. As Adam Kelly points out, 
for Hägglund, the logic of chronolibido not only precedes and renders internally 
incoherent the author’s extra-literary statements, but also those synoptic statements 
articulated by narrators and protagonists within the text:  
 
By ‘logic’ Hägglund actually means something closer to experiential or 
phenomenological description, because there is not only one logic at play 
in either the Recherche or Ada. There are in fact two: a logic of synthetic 
statement, and a contradictory logic of description.  
What validates the privileging of description over statement? Although it is 
not fully thematized by the book’s author, this question goes to the heart 
of the methodology of Dying for Time. Hägglund’s philosophical answer is 
that the desire for fullness present in synthetic statements is ‘a rationalized 
repression of the double bind’ of libidinal being (152), a double bind that is 
more easily observed in the less conceptual, more affective lens of 
description. Occluded but identifiable here is something like a revisionary 
theory of literary realism, where the synthesis offered by the narrator or 
subject of a text can in fact be viewed as a repression of the true lessons of 
his story, embodied not in summary but in description. […]  
Proust, Woolf, and Nabokov […] emerge not so much as philosophers of 
time as writers of time. Their literary way of describing temporal experience 
outstrips attempts to conceptualize temporal being in a more traditionally 
philosophical manner.4  
 
This potential ‘revisionary theory of literary realism’ is as much a product of Kelly’s acute 
reading as of Hägglund’s text. The explanatory privilege afforded to experiential 
description over antithetical statements is not only under-theorised, but also 
inconsistently practised; Hägglund in fact appeals more frequently to statements than 
descriptions, and his first example from Ada is a straightforward narratorial reflection on 
temporal finitude. Nevertheless, together Hägglund and Kelly make visible the prospect 
of a more affective, and less conceptual, critical approach, attuned to the specifically 
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literary ways novels engage with human experience (including description, but also 
dialogue, characterisation, and much else).  
 Hägglund certainly places great emphasis on affect, proclaiming that:  
 
[it is] the logic of chronolibido that is expressive of what is at stake in these 
literary works, even and especially in their moments of greatest significance and affective 
intensity. […] Proust, Woolf, and Nabokov […] practice a chronolibidinal 
aesthetics, which depends on the attachment to mortal life and engages the 
pathos of survival in the experience of the reader. (DFT, p. 19; emphasis added) 
 
Hägglund’s appealing attentiveness to the affective force of the literary, however, turns 
out to be more rhetorical than realised in his readings. Consider Hägglund’s first textual 
analysis (rather than citation of narratorial statement) and the sentence he quotes from 
Ada:  
 
The logic of chronolibido thus emerges in beautiful, entangled phrases - as 
when Van describes how the sight of Ada’s twelve-year-old hands gave rise 
to ‘agonies of unresolvable adoration.’ Van’s adoration here signifies an 
irrevocable emotion; it is ‘unresolvable’ in the sense that it cannot be 
dissolved. At the same time, even the seemingly perpetual bond of love can 
always be broken and is thus characterized by an ‘unresolvable’ 
contradiction that permeates Van’s adoration with symptomatic agonies. 
(DFT, pp. 89-90) 
 
The pathos of the carpus, the grace of the phalanges demanding helpless 
genuflections, a mist of brimming tears, agonies of unresolvable 
adoration.5  
 
Hägglund’s point seems to be that, because of the chronolibidinal nature of temporal life, 
Van’s adoration is necessarily permeated by agony. But the adjective ‘unresolvable’ in fact 
qualifies ‘adoration’, not the relationship between the two emotions as Hägglund implies. 
His reading effectively dislocates the syntax of the sentence to form a (new) logical 
proposition, rather than registering its own implications and affects.6 Describing 
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adoration as ‘unresolvable’ invokes several meanings for ‘resolve’ listed in the OED, 
including to relieve, dissolve, soften, reduce, slacken, or cause to cease, which each seem 
to be in play here (and in an irresolvable way). The common implication is that Van’s 
adoration cannot be consummated or alleviated, whilst the rationalistic connotation of 
the word suggests that this feeling in some sense resists being explicated or accounted 
for. Such a resistance is vividly evoked by the sentence as a whole through the humorous 
dissonance between the rhetorically excessive figures of intense emotion and the 
technical anatomical vocabulary used to describe their cause. This effect is heightened by 
the use of the definite article, and the absence both of verbs and of an experiencing 
subject, as though ludicrously suggesting that the sight of Ada’s carpus and phalanges 
might move anyone to tears. Rather than engaging our empathetic pathos, part of the 
strangeness and playfulness of the passage is precisely that it stages a disparity between its 
evocation of a character’s feelings and the affects the language of the description 
engenders for readers.  
 Though Hägglund professes to be examining ‘the link between the affective 
power of aesthetic representation and the investment in mortal life’ (DFT, p. 2), the 
relationship between his chronolibidinal explication and the feelings the quotation evokes 
remains tenuous. To be clear, my claim is not that Hägglund’s argument about 
chronolibido is logically flawed or even untrue, but that, as a method of close reading, it 
does not tell us much about the aesthetic singularity of the literary work. As Marc Farrant 
points out, Hägglund’s ‘all-pervasive logical account of temporality is so powerfully 
inoculating [that] it certainly does not require any form of literary support […] [H]is 
readings […] could have been, reasonably speaking, derived from any source.’7 By 
persistently resolving the specificity of the literary into a general philosophical concept, 
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Hägglund’s insistence that ‘chronolibido is not an extrinsic theory applied to the novels, 
but something intrinsic to the fictional works’ (DFT, pp. 18-19) appears doubtful. 
Shoshana Felman, in her critique of applied criticism, contends that ‘one can use theories 
[…] only as enabling metaphorical devices, not as extrapolated, preconceived items of 
knowledge.’8 Chronolibido precisely functions as preconceived knowledge which 
programmes the textual analysis in a manner that is logically sound but aesthetically and 
affectively desensitised, leaving us with only a minimal sense of what it is like to read the 
remarkable literary fictions being discussed.  
 By contrast, Boyd claims to be aiding our appreciation of the uniqueness of 
‘Nabokov’s style’ at the ‘profound level of the reading experience’, opening his canonical 
study, Nabokov’s Ada: The Place of Consciousness, with the subtitle ‘Nabokov and the Reader’ 
(though not, note, ‘Ada and the Reader’).9 Boyd begins by fleshing out Nabokov’s own 
analogy between reading and solving chess problems, suggesting that elements of the 
novel initially ‘resist’ disclosing meaning, but by continuing to read, tracing allusions, or 
making internal connections, we can discover ‘solutions’ to ‘the myriad little problems he 
sets the reader’ (NA, p. 21). This process of resistance and solution, for Boyd, expresses 
‘Nabokov’s belief that the world resists the mind so thoroughly because it is so real, 
because it exists so resolutely outside the mind’ (NA, p. 21). The text is thus  
 
apprehended in the same way as the mind apprehends its world. Reading 
one of Nabokov’s works allows us to become aware of the process of 
gradually distinguishing and relating things in more and more detail: we 
experience an ever-deepening knowledge of reality […] Nabokov makes 
the relationship between reader and text an image and an enactment of the 
tussle between the individual mind and the world. (NA, p. 41, p. 60)  
 
What is peculiarly powerful about Boyd’s approach is the tenet that literary texts can 
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speak to philosophical concerns through the experiences they engender for readers. But 
the potentially far-reaching implications of this critical insight are limited by two 
interrelated attributes of Boyd’s approach. Boyd reconstructs Nabokov’s philosophical 
opinions (as articulated in interviews, private notes, lectures, and his autobiography) with 
great clarity and detail but, as will be illustrated shortly, his unquestioning adherence to 
and application of these views results in a profound mischaracterisation of the fictional 
works. As a result, like Hägglund, Boyd proceeds from preconceived “knowledge” 
(gleaned from Nabokov) about the nature of human experience. Though he upbraids 
Hägglund for conflating Nabokov’s philosophy with his own, Boyd shows very little 
scepticism towards the author’s highly egoistic and cerebral representation of reading a 
novel.10 Consequently, Boyd pursues the potential correspondences between the reader’s 
experience and Nabokov’s declared metaphysics, rather than the most compelling and 
obvious way that literary fictions engage with phenomenological experience - through the 
description of characters’ thoughts and feelings. Boyd and Hägglund both respond to 
Ada’s manifest concern with the relationships between desire, loss, and time, but their 
eisegetical readings occlude vital dimensions of the text. 
 I suggest that we put Hägglund’s and Boyd’s distinct critical insights into contact, 
taking seriously the interconnections between textual descriptions of characters’ 
experiences and the experiences those descriptions solicit from readers. Any account 
which tries to describe the thoughts and feelings produced by a literary work confronts 
an obvious potential objection - that readers have diverse and often contrary experiences 
of texts, conditioned by their own subjective dispositions, beliefs, emotions, and desires. 
To what extent can we definitively attribute experiences to the text itself? This concern is 
less problematic than it might appear, or rather is a limitation which attends literary 
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criticism generally, rather than just the particular kind of approach I am advocating. 
Reading any literary language to an adequate degree of textual specificity involves 
elucidating the effects achieved by its particular language. Accounting for how this 
language affects readers is simply to recognise the grounds of possibility for any 
interpretation, and to be more explicit about the compromises critics must always make 
when sorting wholly subjective experiences from those which they have good reasons to 
believe originate in inherent properties of the text. Though such distinctions can never be 
final, we can be more confident, precise, and persuasive by illustrating precisely why the 
text’s specific linguistic qualities, or style, engenders particular thoughts and feelings. As 
Derek Attridge points out, ‘[t]hat we experience literary works less as objects than as 
events - and events that can be repeated over and over again and yet never seem exactly 
the same - is something many have acknowledged, but the implications of which few 
have pursued.’11 I suggest that one serious implication is that literary fictions engage with 
human experience by at once representing characters’ thoughts and feelings and soliciting 
particular responses from readers - and that recognising this enables us to produce more 
accurate and compelling critical descriptions which are more faithful to the literary 
singularity of the work.  
 Such an approach raises fundamental doubts about Boyd’s dualistic and highly 
cerebral account of Ada. Let us take, as an example, the first passage of the novel in 
which the word ‘reality’ occurs. The scene recounts the beginning of the affair between 
Demon and Marina, who we later discover to be the parents of the main protagonists, 
Ada and Van. Demon, who is captivated by Marina’s performance in a travestied Eugene 
Onegin, visits the actress backstage ‘and proceeded to possess her between two scenes’, 
before returning to his seat in the auditorium:  
  11 
 
His heart missed a beat and never regretted the lovely loss, as she ran, 
flushed and flustered, in a pink dress into the orchard, earning a claque 
third of the sitting ovation that greeted the instant dispersal of the imbecile 
but colorful transfigurants from Lyaska—or Iveria. Her meeting with 
Baron O., who strolled out of a side alley, all spurs and green tails, 
somehow eluded Demon’s consciousness, so struck was he by the wonder 
of that brief abyss of absolute reality between two bogus fulgurations of 
fabricated life. (p. 12) 
 
This evocation of Demon’s experience is far more strange and complex than can be 
captured by the picture of a mind gradually discovering more about the world. The 
polyvalent ‘heart’, for instance, at once literally describes the organ’s action and 
figuratively describes Demon’s sentiment, evoking a feeling in which the mental and 
physiological are inextricably intertwined, and so unsettling the dualistic conception of a 
mind discrete from embodiment. The passage, with its invented place names, obscure 
referents, and profusion of digressive detail, certainly resists being easily parsed. This 
resistance is accentuated by the fitful movement of the sentences, which lurch between 
several retarding subordinate clauses, before breaking out into breathlessly long final 
phrases. The beginning of the passage produces an expectation that it will culminate with 
an affecting sight which gave rise to an unforgettably profound emotion in Demon, but 
instead we have the surprising metaphysical tenor of his being struck by ‘the wonder of 
that brief abyss of absolute reality between two bogus fulgurations of fabricated life.’ 
Though this vertiginously figurative description again resists being grasped or unpacked 
in any straightforward manner, the temporal ‘brief’ - in concert with the rest of the 
passage - suggests that ‘reality’ is not here synonymous with ‘the world’, or with an acuity 
of perception, but rather is bound up with intense affective experience.  
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 Such peculiar and challenging uses of ‘reality’, far from being exceptional, are 
found throughout Ada. Consider Demon’s later reflection on his changing sentiment 
towards Marina since the end of their affair:  
 
he considered Marina’s pretentious ciel-étoilé hair-dress and tried to realize (in 
the rare full sense of the word), tried to possess the reality of a fact by 
forcing it into the sensuous center, that here was a woman whom he had 
intolerably loved (p. 251) 
 
Through its parenthetical elucidations, the passage effects a kind of re-definition or re-
description of the word ‘realize’. What the ‘rare full sense of the word’ might be is unclear, 
though the OED offers up ‘giving real existence to something’ and ‘to make real for the 
mind’ (from which the common meaning of ‘to become aware of’ derives). ‘[T]o possess 
the reality of a fact’ counterintuitively implies that ‘realising’ something is different from 
apprehending it as a fact, whilst the polysemous ‘sense’ and puzzling ‘sensuous center’ 
(the center of what?) intimate that it is a sensory, rather than solely intellective, act. The 
sexual carriage of ‘possess’ and ‘sensuous’ curiously invokes the specific feelings of erotic 
love that Demon is striving to recapture, as though experiences of realising elude general 
description isolated from what, particularly, is being realised, and by whom. The passage 
mobilises an epistemological idiom in concert with an affective one, exemplifying the way 
in which Ada powerfully draws out the interrelationships between knowing and feeling. It might 
be that the novel plays with or unsettles our ordinary descriptions and conceptions of 
‘reality’, or even ruins the very idea by rendering it irreconcilable with any consistent 
philosophical view, without positing an alternative. Whichever it might be, it is difficult to 
reconcile Ada’s singular experiential evocations with the picture of a mind grasping the 
world in the manner of a cognitive problem.  
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 The influence of Boyd’s highly cerebral reading of Nabokov’s fiction can hardly 
be overstated. Part of the reason for its dominating discussion of Ada is the way its 
central conceptual and methodological precepts derive from the author’s ‘strong 
opinions’; Michal Oklot observes how the ‘implicitly dualist metaphysics on which so 
much Nabokov scholarship, alas, relies’ is one consequence of the critical unwillingness 
to ‘transgress’ the author’s philosophy.12 Even those critics advancing readings which 
dispute Boyd’s have tended to proceed from an implicitly intentionalist ground, whether 
pursuing Nabokov’s declared interest in particular philosophers, or else developing a 
distinct interpretation of his extra-literary statements.13 Leland de la Durantaye’s Style is 
Matter: The Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov, for instance, poses the question ‘how should 
we read Lolita?’, but, as Ellen Pifer points out, despite the book’s title and declared focus, 
there remains an ‘emphasis on expository statements’.14  
 It is the propensity to precipitately appeal outside of the text which raises an 
obvious objection to Boyd’s claim that Ada’s ‘internal allusions combine to suggest […] a 
behind-the-scenes timelessness’, an argument he makes at length in Nabokov’s Ada and to 
which Hägglund does not adequately respond.15 Briefly, Boyd contends that a number of 
peculiar textual coincidences demonstrate the posthumous influence of Van’s and Ada’s 
sister, Lucette, after her suicide, and thus the existence of consciousness beyond death 
(within the fiction). The first and most persuasive example Boyd appeals to is a scene in 
which Van and Ada, who have been incestuously involved since childhood, finally reunite 
after a long period of separation. A dull evening meal initially leaves both despondent 
about the apparent demise of their desire, but as Ada journeys towards the nearest 
airport, she finds her love for Van suddenly rekindled, and instructs her driver to turn 
back ‘somewhere near Morzhey (“morses” or “walruses,” a Russian pun on “Morges”—
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maybe a mermaid’s message)’ (p. 562). Noting that Lucette is described several times as a 
mermaid, Boyd concludes that ‘Ada’s change of mind’ is ‘inspired somehow by dead 
Lucette’, and cites ‘similar transgressions’ of ‘the ordinary rules of fiction’ found in other 
Nabokov works (NA, p. 203). What is problematic about Boyd’s theory, however, is that 
it ultimately rests on these textual coincidences being attributable to Nabokov, rather 
than Van, the intra-fictive author of the memoir. Given that Lucette’s unrequited love for 
Van provokes her to suicide, it seems far more plausible to suggest that her peculiar 
presence in the narration emerges, consciously or unconsciously, from his feelings of 
guilt and remorse.  
 Boyd’s unwillingness to imagine more complex possibilities of subjectivity, 
authorship, or writing is symptomatic of a more general lack of interest in literary 
theoretical issues found in Nabokov studies (like most Nabokov critics, Boyd 
unsurprisingly shares the author’s offhand aversion to Freud). Pifer’s Nabokov and the 
Novel is perhaps the best example of a study which bucks this trend, yet her description 
of Nabokov’s fiction as an ‘epistemological enterprise’ concerned with ‘grasping the 
essence of reality’ retains Boyd’s strongly epistemological emphasis, which has proven 
remarkably resilient, residing in even those accounts which expressly challenge his own.16 
This resilience is in fact not surprising, for there is a sense in which Boyd’s model of 
problem and solution thematises its own allure, demonstrating at length how a critic who 
takes up an epistemological lens is rewarded with the reassuring feeling of “knowing” the 
text. The challenge is to resist this powerful pressure to resolve the text in cerebral terms, 
and respond to how readers experience the work of fiction as an event, which has its 
affective dimension. Indeed, my preliminary discussion of Ada has pointed precisely to 
the ways in which it shows experiences of knowing to be inseparably bound up with 
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feeling. In the following short reading of the novel, I want to develop this claim and 
unpack some of its implications, both for our understanding of Nabokov’s fiction, and 
for the praxis of philosophically invested literary criticism more generally.  
 
 The unusual narration of Ada significantly affects how we read its powerfully 
evocative experiential descriptions. The novel recounts the love affair between Van Veen 
and Ada Veen from their first meeting in the summer of 1884, when Van is fourteen 
years old and Ada twelve. The two children quickly discover that they are not in fact 
cousins, as they have been raised to believe, but biological siblings, though this 
knowledge seems to only heighten the erotic pleasure they find in the illicit nature of their 
affair. The relationship is broken off and resumed several times over the ensuing decades, 
before they are finally reunited in 1922. The narrative spans several hundred pages, and is 
far too rich, expansive, and diverse for a comprehensive account here; my reading will 
therefore focus on two short chapters from the first part of the book, which describe the 
first burgeoning of Van’s desire for Ada. The novel’s narrative form initially appears to 
be third person, but through notes and editorial commentary incorporated into the text 
we gradually learn that Van (with occasional interventions from Ada) is the principle 
author of this memoir, which is begun in 1957 and remains unfinished when the siblings 
die a decade later. The “marginalia” predominantly consist of Van and Ada’s loving 
observations, reflections, and dialogues about the draft manuscript of the memoir, 
intimately addressed to one another in the first person. These shifts between first, 
second, and third-person pronouns, sometimes in the midst of a sentence, profoundly 
unsettle the unfolding of the diegesis. Van’s narration assumes and exploits the rhetorical 
resources of authorial fictive discourse, especially the omniscient perception of 
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characters’ thoughts and feelings, whereas this is actually an individual’s “factual” 
account, ostensibly narrated from personal knowledge. The sporadic pronominal 
slippages are one way in which this disparity is raised for readers; in recognising that this 
is Van’s narration, we also recognise that his knowledge is limited, and that his narrative 
palpably, outrageously exceeds such limits.  
 We can see how this awareness begins to complicate our reading of Ada in the 
opening clause of the theatre scene quoted earlier: ‘His heart missed a beat and never 
regretted the lovely loss’. The narrative context and representation of Van and Demon’s 
relationship throughout the novel make it extremely improbable that Van would have 
known about this sexual encounter, let alone his father’s momentary bodily and 
emotional response. As such, the clause is emblematic of the fantastical quality which 
colours the scene - and indeed Ada - as a whole. On the surface, it seems that we can 
only take this to be Van’s fantasy, its “reality” (in the conventional sense of 
corresponding to some true state of affairs) rendered highly questionable. Yet the scene is 
evoked as vividly as any other in the novel, and part of its affect derives from its reading 
as a kind of origin myth of Van and Ada’s procreation which, like all origin myths, 
incarnates their cardinal shared value - the pursuit of supremely intense sensual feeling. In 
this sense, it has a kind of affective reality or force which we might not want to too 
hastily dismiss. Our knowing that Van’s narration is epistemologically overreaching does 
not simply render his story about Demon irrelevant, but rather brings into relief the 
possibility that the significance of such evocations might eclipse their “reality,” 
conventionally conceived. This is a relatively straightforward example of the more general 
manner in which Ada demands that we not only attend to its experiential descriptions, 
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but also attend to how the novel’s framing and interpreting those descriptions affects our 
response to them.  
 Some of the more troubling implications of the frame narrative begin to take 
effect in chapter nine of Ada. The first of the chapter’s four paragraphs begins:  
 
Was she really pretty, at twelve? Did he want—would he ever want to 
caress her, to really caress her? Her black hair cascaded over one clavicle 
and the gesture she made of shaking it back and the dimple on her pale 
cheek were revelations with an element of immediate recognition about 
them. Her pallor shone, her blackness blazed. The pleated skirts she liked 
were becomingly short. Even her bare limbs were so free from suntan that 
one’s gaze, stroking her white shins and forearms, could follow upon them 
the regular slants of fine dark hairs, the silks of her girlhood. (p. 58)  
 
There is a pronounced erotic excitement to the passage, with its reiterations and 
repetitions (‘want’ and ‘caress’), and the voyeuristic pleasure exhibited in the catalogue of 
Ada’s body and the tactile visuality of ‘one’s gaze, stroking her white shins and forearms’. 
In a more straightforward narrative, we might read this eroticism as solely evoking the 
young Van’s thoughts and feelings about Ada through free indirect discourse. Yet the 
indefinite ‘one’ draws attention to the peculiar absence of a subject experiencing the 
feelings these sentences manifest: who finds the fall of Ada’s hair a revelation and the 
shortness of her skirts becoming, whose gaze ‘strokes’ her limbs? This subtle 
underdetermination raises two unsettlingly related qualities of the passage. Most 
obviously, the retrospective frame of the narration presents the disturbing prospect of 
the elderly Van sexually luxuriating over recollections of a twelve-year old girl. But more 
disquieting is the almost imperative quality of these subjectless sentences, which involve 
readers in visualising Ada’s body and seem to solicit our complicity in Van’s erotic 
pleasures. This sense of being solicited is only highlighted by the peculiarity of the 
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description, which is so at odds with conventional romantic images of feminine beauty; 
the text does not present an erotic subject, but rather presents its subject erotically, as 
though exhibiting the evocative potency of its language.  
 The anxieties of complicity aroused by the beginning of the chapter are greatly 
intensified by the third paragraph:  
 
What Van experienced in those first strange days when she showed him 
the house—and those nooks in it where they were to make love so soon—
combined elements of ravishment and exasperation. Ravishment—because 
of her pale, voluptuous, impermissible skin, her hair, her legs, her angular 
movements, her gazelle-grass odor, the sudden black stare of her wide-set 
eyes, the rustic nudity under her dress; exasperation—because between 
him, an awkward schoolboy of genius, and that precocious, affected, 
impenetrable child there extended a void of light and a veil of shade that 
no force could overcome and pierce. He swore wretchedly in the 
hopelessness of his bed as he focused his swollen senses on the glimpse of 
her he had engulfed when, on their second excursion to the top of the 
house, she had mounted upon a captain’s trunk to unhasp a sort of 
illuminator through which one acceded to the roof (even the dog had once 
gone there), and a bracket or something wrenched up her skirt and he 
saw—as one sees some sickening miracle in a Biblical fable or a moth’s 
shocking metamorphosis—that the child was darkly flossed. He noticed 
that she seemed to have noticed that he had or might have noticed (what 
he not only noticed but retained with tender terror until he freed himself of 
that vision—much later—and in strange ways) (p. 59)  
 
Though the paragraph is exceedingly complex, its description is clearly driven by a close 
affinity between seeing and sexual desire. The figurative evocation of Van’s vain efforts 
to picture Ada’s body as a struggle to ‘overcome and pierce’ an ‘impenetrable child’ is 
extremely disquieting in its rapacious violence, but becomes even more so in light of its 
possible correlation with the visual imaginings the passage solicits from readers. The 
allusion to the ‘rustic nudity under her dress’ invokes but does not describe Ada’s 
genitalia, arousing anticipation of a more explicit representation. This anticipation is 
frustrated and heightened by the serpentine sentences - with their elaborate syntax, 
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contextual digressions, parenthetical elaborations, and unusual and complex rhetorical 
figures - which strain comprehension and demand an intimate attentiveness to the prose, 
which culminates in the revelation ‘that the child was darkly flossed.’ The first sense of 
‘floss’ found in the OED is ‘the rough silk which envelopes the cocoon of the silk worm.’ 
The peculiarity of this metaphor (which again only figuratively depicts Ada’s pudenda) 
demands the reader’s participation in imagining the girl’s body, discomfortingly aligning 
us with the younger Van as he masturbates over the recalled image. This discomfort is 
acutely intensified by the ethical charge of the epithet ‘child’, which places our interest 
further under suspicion. The passage at once arouses curiosity about ‘[w]hat Van 
experienced’ and engenders feelings of unease, anxiety, and even guilt - illustrating both 
the critical need to capture the vital connections between the text’s representations of 
experience and those it evokes in readers, and how Ada powerfully puts knowing and 
feeling into contact. What I especially want to emphasise here, though, is how this 
paragraph exposes, and for its effects depends upon, the potential for imaginings to give 
rise to strong feelings, regardless of their fictionality.  
 The passage places a similar affective stress on imagination in the parenthetical 
description of how Van ‘saw - as one sees some sickening miracle in a Biblical fable or a 
moth’s shocking metamorphosis - that the child was darkly flossed.’ Van’s seeing - 
contrary to his fervid fantasies - that Ada has pubic hair is analogously described not as a 
discovery which alters his knowledge of her body, but as a supernatural transformation of 
how he imagines it. The peculiar priority given to fantasy here significantly resembles 
Giorgio Agamben’s suggestive account of desire, which can help us unpack some of the 
sentence’s more unusual implications:  
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[L]ove takes as its subject not the immediate sensory thing, but the 
phantasm […] [G]iven the mediating nature of imagination, this means 
that the phantasm is also the subject, not just the object, of Eros. In fact, 
since love has its only site in imagination, desire never directly encounters 
the object in its corporeality […] but [as] an image […] a ‘nova persona’ 
which is literally the product of desire […] within which the boundaries 
between subjective and objective, corporeal and incorporeal, desire and its 
object are abolished.17 
 
Though Van is intensely conscious of the intimate details of Ada’s corporeal body, the 
revelation of her pubic hair is experienced by him precisely as a metamorphosis of the 
nova persona of his desire. Agamben’s figure of the phantasm and his re-description of 
imagination as mediating between desire and its object also resonates with and highlights 
a significant tension in the passage, between Van’s strenuous masturbatory exertion to 
summon the image of Ada’s vulva, and other moments when it seems to haunt or 
possess him. It is richly ambiguous whether Van is the perpetrator or victim of the 
‘ravishment’ he experiences, which both invokes his being entranced by Ada and his 
yearning to sexually possess her. The ambivalent agency and gothic register recur in Van’s 
retaining ‘that vision’ of Ada ‘with tender terror’, yet it being himself who must be ‘freed’ 
from it ‘in strange ways’. Even ‘sickening’ subtly suggests that the sight of Ada’s naked 
crotch infects Van with a desire which he discharges from his body through 
masturbation. The paragraph’s sentences resist our grasping whether the described affects 
originate in subject or object, rendering Van’s perceptions of Ada inextricable from his 
desire.  
The more profound implication of this descriptive mode - that a person’s feelings 
might indelibly contribute to the world they inhabit - is at the heart of the young Ada’s 
‘own little system’, into which she initiates Van towards the end of chapter twelve:  
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An individual’s life consisted of certain classified things: ‘real things’ which 
were unfrequent and priceless, simply ‘things’ which formed the routine 
stuff of life; and ‘ghost things,’ also called ‘fogs,’ such as fever, toothache, 
dreadful disappointments, and death. Three or more things occurring at 
the same time formed a ‘tower,’ or, if they came in immediate succession, 
they made a ‘bridge.’ ‘Real towers’ and ‘real bridges’ were the joys of life, 
and when the towers came in a series, one experienced supreme rapture; it 
almost never happened, though. In some circumstances, in a certain light, a 
neutral ‘thing’ might look or even actually become ‘real’ or else, conversely, 
it might coagulate into a fetid ‘fog.’ When the joy and the joyless happened 
to be intermixed, simultaneously or along the ramp of duration, one was 
confronted with ‘ruined towers’ and ‘broken bridges.’ (pp. 74-5) 
 
Like the earlier descriptions of Demon’s experience, the nomenclature of Ada’s system 
playfully troubles the metaphysical cogency of ‘real’, which here denotes those things 
which give rise to pleasurable feelings. Similarly, the existential ambiguity of ‘things’ is 
exploited to elide distinctions between material objects, abstract concepts, sensory 
perceptions, and fanciful imaginings - like the previous quotation, troubling the 
concomitant boundaries of subjective and objective, corporeal and incorporeal, desire 
and the desired. Clearly aspects of Ada’s system closely resemble some of the elements of 
Ada that we have discussed. But to respond to the passage as the proposition of a 
conceptual theory is to profoundly misread the novel, by treating it as a philosophical 
rather than literary text. Indeed, part of the humour here is precisely how flamboyantly 
particular this apparently universal theory is to Ada’s own life. There is a childlike pleasure 
in ostentatious invention, accompanied by the touching absurdity of Ada’s pairing the 
profoundly absolute with the banally ephemeral (what kind of metaphysical category 
comprises toothaches and death?), and the endearingly upper-class vernacular of 
‘dreadful disappointments’. The passage, in its sheer particularity, seems almost to entice 
and burlesque the desire to extract philosophical propositions from fiction.  
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 This exhibition of the particular facility of literary fiction to evoke singular 
experiences importantly prefaces the final lines of the chapter:  
 
The classical beauty of clover honey, smooth, pale, translucent, freely 
flowing from the spoon and soaking my love’s bread and butter in liquid 
brass. The crumb steeped in nectar. 
‘Real thing?’ he asked. 
‘Tower,’ she answered. 
And the wasp. 
The wasp was investigating her plate. Its body was throbbing. […]  
Her hair was well brushed that day and sheened darkly in contrast with the 
lusterless pallor of her neck and arms. She wore the striped tee shirt which 
in his lone fantasies he especially liked to peel off her twisting torso. The 
oilcloth was divided into blue and white squares. A smear of honey stained 
what remained of the butter in its cool crock. 
‘All right. And the third Real Thing?’ 
She considered him. A fiery droplet in the wick of her mouth considered 
him. A three-colored velvet violet, of which she had done an aquarelle on 
the eve, considered him from its fluted crystal. She said nothing. She licked 
her spread fingers, still looking at him. 
Van, getting no answer, left the balcony. Softly her tower crumbled in the 
sweet silent sun. (pp. 75-6) 
 
Brian Boyd offers the following response to the passage (with reference to Alain Robbe-
Grillet’s Pour un nouveau roman): 
 
The magic of such description lies not only in the precision but also in the 
suggestion of irrelevance emphasized by the dislocation in the sudden 
move from Ada to tablecloth. These things are simply there, independent 
of any design of the author except his desire to put them there for 
themselves […] independent of other things and of any special import, any 
human ‘“significations” (psychologiques, sociales, fonctionelles) 
[psychological, social, functional]’ (NA, p. 32)18 
 
Boyd’s characteristic concern with Nabokov’s design leads him to miss the human import 
of the description, which is very subtly focalised through Van. What is striking is not the 
independence of the objects, but precisely how the description of them is saturated with 
erotic evocations of soaking, throbbing, stripping, smearing, and licking. This sense of 
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sensual pleasure is embodied by the jouissance of the poetic prose, with its rhymes and 
rampant alliterations. The strangeness of the droplet of honey and the violet joining Ada 
in ‘considering’ Van vividly gestures towards how his sense of reality is inseparably bound 
up with his feelings for her. In the final sentence, the focalisation shifts from Van to Ada, 
evoking her lingering pleasure in the sweet honey and tender sorrow at his silence and 
departure. What is exceptional and moving about the passage, and Ada as a novel, is the 
sheer weight lent to singular feeling - captured even in the description of sunlight or the 
most commonplace of objects.  
 
 Nabokov’s fiction has so often been critically represented as the affirmation of 
various philosophical propositions that one could be forgiven for envisaging it as a 
didactic espousal of received morality or conventional wisdom - that reality is too 
complex for the mind to grasp, or that desire is irrevocably linked to loss. By approaching 
Ada through the lens of preconceived “knowledge” (whether their own or Nabokov’s), 
neither Hägglund nor Boyd tells us much about the singular experience of reading this 
fiction. But when the specifically literary qualities of a novel like Ada are taken seriously, 
we encounter a text which concertedly disrupts the pervasive binary of subject and 
object, which vividly plays out variegated feelings of knowing, and which evinces the 
affective and ethical purchase of imagination in the face of the empirically perceptible. 
The short reading offered here only begins to capture how this captivating and 
profoundly unsettling fiction mobilises and brings into relief a gamut of epistemological, 
metaphysical, and ethical concerns - if we but endeavour to respond to the singular ways 
in which it moves readers.  
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